Whether a Company Rises or Falls Is Not Luck, but Whether the Three Multipliers Move in Sync

Pony Ma co-founded Tencent in 1998, and in February 1999 launched the instant-messaging software OICQ (later renamed QQ). Targeting the pain points of Chinese users on the internet in internet cafés, it stored friend lists on the server side and compressed the installer to just over 200K, solving with product power the real needs of "friends vanish when I switch computers" and "downloads take too long on slow connections," and finally beating ICQ, which was far more "sophisticated" in features. In 2004 Tencent listed in Hong Kong; in 2011 it launched WeChat, further amplifying its user-connectivity power. Tencent's E growth has always rested on products that "users genuinely need."

Value conservation mapping: product power amplifies E Economic Value, while "helping users solve problems" itself accumulates S User Trust, providing the base of T Time Compounding for later monetization and ecosystem building.

Sources: Tencent corporate website · Company profile, QQ Encyclopedia, Everyone Is a Product Manager · The Rise of IM

Lei Jun founded Xiaomi in 2010 and released its first phone in August 2011 at RMB 1,999, using an internet model to compress channel costs and a hero-product strategy to scale. In 2015 Xiaomi became the top smartphone shipper in China, and in 2018 it listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. Xiaomi deliberately caps its hardware net margin (pledging the consolidated hardware net margin will never exceed 5%) and gives the savings back to users - a multiplication logic of "exchanging profit for efficiency, and trust for scale": E's amplifier is not raising prices but efficiency.

Value conservation mapping: compressing gross margin to win scale (E Efficiency), giving up profit to users in exchange for S Trust and Reputation, and accumulating T Long-Term User Assets through community co-creation. The three multipliers leverage one another.

Sources: Xiaomi Technology Encyclopedia, The Paper · Lei Jun's speech at Xiaomi's 10th anniversary

In December 1984, Zhang Ruimin took over the Qingdao General Refrigerator Factory, which was losing RMB 1.47 million. In 1985, facing 76 defective refrigerators in an era when "even defective goods had to be bought with ration coupons," he chose to smash them publicly, and the production workers did the smashing themselves. What that hammer smashed out was not loss but the whole plant's quality consciousness and users' trust. Haier then deepened its famous-brand strategy by "making only one refrigerator product for seven years," winning the first gold medal in Chinese refrigerator history in 1988, and gradually growing into a global leader in white goods.

Value conservation mapping: exchanging a short-term E "loss" (smashing 76 salable refrigerators) for the establishment of S Quality Trust; trust then brings E Brand Premium and underpins later T Internationalization and Diversification Compounding - the most classic "multiplicative investment."

Sources: Haier Group official site · Zhang Ruimin, Haier Group official site · 35 years of entrepreneurship

Huawei was founded in 1987 and for more than three decades has insisted on "investing no less than 10% of sales revenue in R&D every year," staying out of real estate and speculative money. Ren Zhengfei has said, "Charge only at one breach in the wall" and "Be willing to sit on a cold bench for ten years." In 2018 R&D spending was RMB 101.5 billion, 14.1% of revenue; cumulative R&D over the past decade exceeded RMB 1.382 trillion, and in 2025 R&D reached RMB 192.3 billion, about 21.8% of revenue. Sustained time investment becomes technological accumulation - the most direct display of T's compounding effect.

Value conservation mapping: steadily converting profit into T R&D Compounding, R&D produces E Product Competitiveness, and strong products win S Customer Trust - T is the first driving force of Huawei's multiplicative flywheel.

Sources: Huawei Annual Report 2025, CCTV.com · Resilience of China's Economy · Huawei

Vanke completed its joint-stock reform in 1988 and entered real estate, listing on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 1991. In 1993, in an era when "whatever makes money, do it," Wang Shi overrode the objections and decided to cut the profitable trading, retail, film, and beverage businesses to focus on residential development. It was this "cutting off one's own revenue" decision, together with the HK$450 million raised in 1993 through a B-share issue as "winter survival funds," that let Vanke survive the subsequent macro tightening and grow into one of the world's largest specialized residential developers.

Value conservation mapping: forgoing the E temptation of short-term diversification in exchange for T Strategic Focus and Cycle Safety; focus brings E Endogenous Compounding in the Core Business, and sound operations win S Capital-Market Trust.

Sources: China Economic Net · Wang Shi and Vanke's 33 years, Securities Times · Twenty Years of a Rising Market That Bred the Vanke Model

DeLong was founded in Xinjiang in 1986. At its peak it controlled some 177 subsidiary and sub-subsidiary companies and 19 financial institutions, was dubbed "the strongest market-maker on the stock market," and once held total assets above RMB 20 billion. Its model: take controlling stakes in three listed firms - Xiang Torch, Hejin Investment, and Xinjiang Tunhe (the "three old stocks") - push share prices up, pledge and refinance repeatedly, then use the money to buy real businesses - in effect funding long-term investments with short-term loans. According to financial analyses, DeLong's informal financing rates were often above 13%, and when the funding chain tightened it even quoted 18%-20%. Through 2003-2004 the trio's equity was pledged again and again; in April 2004 share prices crashed, the funding chain snapped, Tang Wanxin fled the country in May 2004, and DeLong finally ended in convictions for illegally absorbing public deposits and manipulating securities trading prices.

Value conservation mapping: using leverage to inflate E (book market value and assets) without limit, while sacrificing S (the trust of investors and financial institutions) and T (the sustainability of borrowing short and lending long). No matter how big the numerator, when the denominator hits zero, Y hits zero. "Never use short-term borrowings for long-term investments" - the warning of financial rules is precisely a footnote to the division formula.

Sources: Sina Finance · Decoding the five layers of DeLong's failure, China Securities Journal · A review of DeLong's high-leverage M&A, DeLong Incident Encyclopedia

Mou Qizhong became famous for "trading canned goods for airplanes" and in the early 1990s became a China's-richest-man-style business legend. But he refused to build a solid industrial and profit base, championed "bare-handed deals" and "virtual capital," and launched grand narratives such as satellite launches and the development of Manzhouli. In 1995-1996, to plug funding holes, he fabricated import-trade backdrops through the Hubei Light Industrial Products Import & Export Company, obtained 33 letters of credit, and extracted US$75.074 million (about RMB 620 million), causing nearly RMB 300 million in national losses. He was detained in January 1999, sentenced to life imprisonment for letter-of-credit fraud in 2000, later reduced to 18 years, and released in 2016. He once said, "Farming is worse than working, working is worse than trading, and trading is worse than borrowing money" - the extreme of division: building E on the timing gaps of financial instruments and on institutional loopholes.

Value conservation mapping: E inflated by "resource integration and leverage", T (industry and time accumulation) at zero, S (trust in institutions and partners) negative. Virtual capital inflates numbers and vaporizes trust - the total finally zeros out through a double collapse, legal and commercial.

Sources: China News Service · Mou Qizhong released from prison, Phoenix News · Mou Qizhong's letter-of-credit trap, People's Daily Online · Mou Qizhong's third release

After Gu Chujun took control of Kelon Electric in 2001, he rapidly expanded the "Greencool system" through a series of acquisitions (Meiling, Yaxing Coach, ST Xiangyang Bearing, and others), and in 2004 was publicly challenged by Larry Lang as "a carnival in the feast of state retreat and private advance." Investigations in 2004-2005 showed he diverted huge sums from Kelon to fund acquisitions and to register personal companies; in 2005 Kelon was revealed to have lost RMB 3.693 billion with negative net assets of RMB 1.09 billion, and Gu Chujun was placed under CSRC investigation and detained. In 2018 the Supreme People's Court retried the case, affirming his misappropriation of funds conviction while correcting some charges - but the Kelon brand was already badly wounded.

Value conservation mapping: driving M&A with capital operations (E reported scale) and overdrawing S (trust of minority shareholders and the public) and T (compliance and sustainability). The larger the "numerator" of financial fraud, the emptier the "denominator" of law and trust, until it is liquidated by regulators and the market at once.

Sources: Supreme People's Court · Retrial judgment in the Gu Chujun case, China Securities Journal · The Greencool system seven years after its fall, Greencool System Encyclopedia

Tai Yang Shen started with RMB 50,000 in 1988 and reached RMB 1.3 billion in sales in 1993; its bio-health oral liquid and hericium oral liquid commanded as much as 63% of the market at their peak, and its brand assets were appraised at RMB 2.6 billion - its scale once surpassed Haier and Lenovo of the same era. It was precisely the rapid ballooning of wealth that led Huai Hanxin to shift strategy to "advancing on vertical and horizontal fronts at once": within one year he launched more than 20 projects - petroleum, real estate, cosmetics, computers, border trade, hotels - and the RMB 340 million invested within two years was almost entirely wasted. The nightmare began in 1994; sales fell to a bit over RMB 200 million in 1997 and to about RMB 160 million by 2000, and its Hong Kong-listed share price bottomed at HK$0.09.

Value conservation mapping: the moment of diversification pulled E (capital and attention) out of the core business, and S (brand and channel mindshare) and T (professional accumulation) were diluted. Huai Hanxin later reflected that he had failed to build a disciplined investment-review and monitoring system - absent governance is exactly the breeding ground where division flourishes.

Sources: Sina Finance · Huai Hanxin: pioneer and martyr of the CIS strategy, Fortune Review · The rise and fall of Tai Yang Shen

Shi Yuzhu built his fortune in 1989 on the M-6401 typesetting software, and in 1993 Giant became China's second-largest private high-tech firm. He then stepped out of the computer industry into bioengineering and real estate at the same time: the Giant Building escalated from 18 floors all the way to a planned 78 - "China's tallest building" - and its budget ballooned from RMB 200 million to RMB 1.2 billion. The tower was bankrolled by pre-selling units off the plan and by diverting profits from his health products (Brain Gold), which in turn depended on advertising bombardment. In 1995 the health-product industry was rectified over exaggerated claims, and the profit source snapped. In February 1997 the Giant Building, only three storeys built, was halted; Shi Yuzhu left in defeat with RMB 250 million in debt.

Value conservation mapping: pouring all of E's core-business cash flow into a "face project," T's sustainability zeroed out, S (trust of homebuyers, shareholders, and partners) collapses - one multiplier drags the whole multiplicative total to zero. Shi Yuzhu later reflected, "This was the biggest decision-making mistake of my life."

Sources: Giant Building Encyclopedia, Sina Finance · Shi Yuzhu's reflections on the Giant Building

Jianlibao shot to fame in 1984 as the Chinese delegation's preferred beverage at the Los Angeles Olympics and was hailed as "China's magic water." Sales reached RMB 1.8 billion in 1994 and RMB 5 billion in 1997, ranking first nationally in output, sales, and tax; its brand value was appraised at up to RMB 6 billion. But as a state-owned enterprise whose property rights belonged to Sanshui county government, Li Jingwei - who "raised it with his own hands" - held almost no equity. In 1997 he spent about RMB 1 billion building the 38-storey Jianlibao Tower in Guangzhou, which the local government saw as "moving away the money tree," and the two sides fell out; afterward R&D, advertising, and listing were blocked at every turn, and Coca-Cola and Pepsi "drowned seven armies with two colas." In 2001 the Sanshui government refused a management buyout; in 2002 it sold 75% of Jianlibao to the capital player Zhang Hai for RMB 338 million; Li Jingwei was later sentenced to 15 years on corruption charges, and a generation of national beverage faded.

Value conservation mapping: unclear property rights turned S (trust between government and business and organizational relations) from cooperation into gaming, T (long-term strategy and listing plans) was interrupted by administrative will, and E (channels and brand) consequently stalled. When social value (relationships and trust) breaks down, no amount of economic value can hold - this is the other face of division: not active overdraft, but institutions that keep S from appreciating.

Sources: People's Daily Online · The four-act tragedy of Jianlibao's defeat, Li Jingwei Encyclopedia

Evergrande sprinted on a "high debt, high leverage, high turnover" model: total liabilities reached RMB 1.16 trillion at the end of 2016; interest-bearing debt in 2017 was RMB 732.6 billion with annual interest of about RMB 54.1 billion; and even after 2017 set the tone of "housing is for living, not for speculation" and peers began deleveraging, Evergrande still set its most aggressive land-acquisition record. From 2013 it also plunged into football, mineral water, grain and oil, and automobiles, spending enormous sums. In 2020 the "Three Red Lines" were introduced; Evergrande tripped all three and its financing channels were choked off. In 2021 the crisis went public; by end-2022 total liabilities exceeded RMB 2.4 trillion with combined net losses of over RMB 800 billion in two years; and in 2024 the Hong Kong High Court issued a winding-up order against China Evergrande.

Value conservation mapping: mistaking an era dividend (urbanization plus loose credit) for one's own ability, and using E's scale numbers to cover the double overdraft of T (unsustainable leverage) and S (trust of homeowners, suppliers, and wealth-management users) - once the policy dividend was withdrawn, a RMB 2.4 trillion "numerator" instantly became a RMB 2.4 trillion "denominator."

Sources: China Newsweek · Why Evergrande, RMB 2.4 trillion in debt, stopped pretending, China Economic Net · A deep read of Evergrande's results announcements

Sunco started in 1994 as a Tianjin second-hand housing agency, and in 2003 proclaimed it would "catch up with Vanke in three years." It then frantically bought land nationwide on a "cash flow-land-cash flow" high-turnover model: in 2004 it reached ten-billion-yuan-level sales while developing 35 projects and swelling to 8,000 employees, compressing the development cycle from the industry's conventional 18 months to around 7 months and leveraging large projects on minimal equity. Its 2004 listing failed, and in 2005 cash collections fell short; the funding gap exceeded RMB 3 billion, and at the most critical moment the Suzhou project had only RMB 16 left in its account. In September 2006 Sun Hongbin sold 55% of Sunco China to Hong Kong's Road King Infrastructure for about RMB 1.28 billion - handing over 12 years of his life's work with his own hands.

Value conservation mapping: using E's sales scale to buy a total overdraft of T (funding-chain safety): high turnover gambles that "future home prices will surely rise"; once regulation tightens and collections underperform, the bigger the scale, the faster the crash. Ten bottle necks, four or five lids - a T shortfall cannot be patched with E.

Sources: Sina News · Sunco: the end of a real-estate myth, CCTV.com · Media dissect the death of land-price king Sunco

When the Asia Plaza mall opened in May 1989, it ignited the "Central Plains retail war"; with turnover of RMB 186 million in 1990 it ranked among the nation's large department stores, and a 1992 CCTV documentary, Retail War, made it famous nationwide. Wang Suizhou then proposed building a "Chinese retail chain empire": six Asia stores within the province and nine Qiancun department stores outside it. Stores in Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou each lost tens of millions monthly, and both talent pipelines and funding chains failed to keep up. Wang Suizhou resigned in 1997; that August more than 300 suppliers besieged the company demanding payment; in September 2000 the Zhengzhou Intermediate Court declared Asia bankrupt, with external debts of RMB 1.58 billion and a debt-to-asset ratio of 713%.

Value conservation mapping: leveraging nearly RMB 2 billion of investment on RMB 40 million of equity is an extreme amplification of E's scale, at the cost of a total overdraft of S (trust of suppliers, banks, and employees) and T (management capability matching). A 713% debt ratio means the total Y had long since been divided into a negative number.

Sources: Zhengzhou Daily · Wang Suizhou: a retail war ignites, Sina Finance · The Central Plains retail war

Hu Zhibiao started in 1995 with a childhood friend, each putting up RMB 2,000, making VCD players on a model of "collecting dealer prepayments first, paying the supply chain later." Output reached RMB 200 million in 1996 and shot to RMB 1.6 billion in 1997; that November he won CCTV's 1998 advertising "bid king" for RMB 210 million, with Jackie Chan as spokesperson. But financially he "treated cash as profit and prepayments as own capital," with no budgets, no statements, and no cash controls; on the equity side Hu Zhibiao and Chen Tiannan each held 45%, with no controlling shareholder and no mature board. In April 1999 Chen Tiannan attacked him via newspaper announcements; dealers stampeded for refunds and suppliers pressed for payment, and the funding chain snapped instantly. Hu Zhibiao was detained in April 2000 and sentenced at first instance in 2003 to 20 years (reduced to 8 on appeal). In liquidation total assets were under RMB 300 million while liabilities exceeded RMB 400 million.

Value conservation mapping: marketing (E's fleeting buzz) masked a double emptiness in S (governance and equity trust) and T (sustainability of cash flow and R&D): heavy on advertising, light on R&D, no core patents - once the industry window passed (DVD replacing VCD), Aiduo had no second curve.

Sources: China Economic Weekly · Rise and fall of Aiduo VCD, Xinhua Net · Former bid king Hu Zhibiao, Aiduo VCD Encyclopedia

In early 2002 Jiangsu Tebon planned an integrated steel project with designed capacity of 8.4 million tonnes in Changzhou and Yangzhong, with a total estimated investment of RMB 10.59 billion. To evade approval, it split the project into 22 separately approved pieces, while local governments approved it ultra vires and illegally; 6,541 mu of land was occupied illegally (including 1,200 mu of prime farmland), and land acquisition and demolition proceeded without lawful land-use procedures. In March 2004 the Jiangsu provincial government ordered a full halt; a State Council special inspection team characterized it as "a major case of serious dereliction and illegality by local governments and departments, with the enterprise suspected of crimes," and Dai Guofang and nine others were detained.

Value conservation mapping: building E (steel capacity and local political achievements) on the cost of destroying farmland and overdrawing institutions and the environment; S (compliance, fairness, and people's interests) falls to zero; and T (sustainability) becomes impossible - the state's macro-control intervention was precisely to repair the S and T that had been shrunk.

Sources: State Council Gazette · Investigation and handling notice on Tebon's illegal construction, CCTV Focus Report · The Tebon case

Sanzhu was founded in 1994 and expanded rapidly through "encircling the cities from the countryside" ground promotion and saturation advertising, reaching about RMB 2 billion in sales in 1995 and a peak of RMB 8 billion in 1996, with a marketing force reportedly numbering 150,000. But its claims of "curing all diseases" had long overdrawn trust. In June 1996 an elderly man in Changde, Hunan, Chen Boshun, died after taking Sanzhu oral liquid, and his family sued; in March 1998 the Changde Intermediate Court ruled against Sanzhu at first instance, and the media reported it widely under headlines like "Eight bottles of Sanzhu kill an old man." Monthly national sales then plunged from hundreds of millions to under RMB 10 million; about 130,000 marketing staff were laid off and more than 200 subsidiaries closed. In 1999 the Hunan High Court reversed on final appeal in Sanzhu's favor, but market confidence could not be recovered.

Value conservation mapping: advertising bombardment inflated E (book sales) while detaching it from real product power, and S (consumer trust) was overdrawn to the breaking point. One incident, one judgment, and S hit zero in an instant - in the multiplication formula, when S hits zero, Y immediately hits zero, and no numerator can save it.

Sources: Dazhong Net · Business Life Issue 53 · The tragic Wu Bingxin, Sohu · A history of Sanzhu oral liquid's demise

In November 1995 the small Linqu County distillery Qinchi won CCTV's bid-king title for RMB 66.66 million, and in November 1996 retained it for RMB 321.2118 million (about 6.4 times that year's profit); that year sales soared from just over RMB 100 million to RMB 950 million. But Qinchi's own base-wine capacity was only about 3,000 tonnes a year - nowhere near the anticipated RMB 1.5 billion scale. In January 1997 the Economic Information Daily reported that it bought large volumes of Sichuan base wine to "blend" in-house, puncturing its "self-brewed famous liquor" persona. After trust collapsed, sales fell to about RMB 600 million in 1997 and were halved again to RMB 300 million in 1998; in 2000 Qinchi was sued for unpaid debts and its trademark was auctioned. Wu Xiaobo writes: "Qinchi is a cripple - one leg sprinting to build fame, the other stuck deep in the mud."

Value conservation mapping: name-building pushed E (buzz and sales) to its short-term extreme, but T (capacity and time-tested accumulation) was seriously absent, and S (consumer trust) rested on a false persona. Buzz ran ahead of capability - the scissors gap between marketing and reality is exactly the S that was overdrawn.

Sources: Ji Changkong Encyclopedia, Dazhong Net · The disaster of Qinchi's name-building, Xueqiu · Qinchi made and broken by the bid king

ofo started on the campus of Peking University. From 2015 to 2017, propelled by capital, it fought a subsidy war against Mobike, dumping bikes wildly and trading cash-burning for scale, raising cumulatively several billion yuan across multiple rounds. But the business model never proved profitable, and it was suspected of diverting user deposits to sustain expansion. In 2018 the funding chain snapped; from December a refund stampede broke out: online queues for deposit refunds once exceeded 13 million users, with pending refunds estimated at RMB 1-2 billion; founder Dai Wei was restricted from high consumption and the company was listed as a judgment debtor. In 2020 ofo's operating entity was placed on the list of abnormal operations - "vanished from the face of the earth."

Value conservation mapping: burning cash and sprinting with E (orders and market scale) as the core goal, T (profitable model and sustainability) always absent, and most critically diverting and overdrawing users' S (the trust embodied in deposits) - once the stampede began, S hit zero and the business empire collapsed with it.

Sources: People's Daily Online · The dilemma of 13 million ofo users awaiting deposit refunds, China Economic Net · ofo refund queue tops ten million

Shenyang Feilong started in 1990 on RMB 20,000, and by 1993 produced RMB 1 billion in output and RMB 200 million in profit, pushing Yansheng Hubao liquid nationwide through "carpet-bombing" advertising; in both 1993 and 1994 ad spending exceeded RMB 100 million. But its finance department kept accounts without checking reality, branch companies routinely diverted payments, advertising produced no repurchase, and products had no R&D. When it sought a Hong Kong listing in 1994-1995, Hong Kong institutions fired 2,870 questions, exposing that "R&D spending was near zero"; after the listing collapsed, Jiang Wei announced that "Feilong was entering a restructuring period," freezing the national distribution system overnight. In 1996 he published The President's Twenty Great Mistakes, confessing to "romanticized decision-making, ineffective advertising, and nepotism" - Feilong never recovered.

Value conservation mapping: advertising is E's stimulant: it can lift sales in the short term but cannot create T (R&D and repurchase) or genuine S (user trust). The reflection essays of Wu Bingxin and Jiang Wei (the fifteen great mistakes and the twenty great mistakes) all state the same fact: when growth relies only on volume, not value, once speed stops, the flaws all show.

Sources: Jiemian News · The health product that never disappears, Jiang Wei Encyclopedia, Shanque · Interview with Jiang Wei

Yang Rong took control of the Brilliance system in 1991; in October 1992 Brilliance China Automotive listed on the New York Stock Exchange, the first Chinese enterprise with state background to list overseas, raising US$80 million, and the Brilliance system's assets once reached RMB 30 billion. But Brilliance's equity was held under the name of the "China Financial Education Development Foundation," making its property nature highly ambiguous. In March 2002 the Ministry of Finance's Document No. 5 determined that all Brilliance assets were state assets and transferred them to the Liaoning provincial government; after Yang Rong refused to hand over, he was dismissed, arrested on suspicion of crimes, and left the country illegally. In December 2002, Brilliance China's equity was taken back into state hands by "New Brilliance" at HK$0.10 per share, about 7% of market value. This "property-right confirmation" struggle ended with the founder out and the enterprise gravely weakened.

Value conservation mapping: when S (institutional trust in property rights and government-business relations) remains unresolved, T (expectation of long-term corporate stability) cannot be established, and the E (RMB 30 billion in assets) created by the founder becomes an object of contention rather than an appreciating asset. Unclear property rights are the deepest mine buried in a company's social value.

Sources: Yang Rong Case Encyclopedia, China News Service · New Brilliance integrates old Brilliance, China Economic Net · Brilliance: made and unmade

In 1995 Zhang Shuxin founded Yinghaiwei and asked, "How far are the Chinese people from the information superhighway?" - earning the company a place as a pioneer of China's internet. It built its own physical network and burned money buying equipment for access - a business model seriously ahead of its time. In 1997 it invested about RMB 140 million but earned only RMB 9.63 million for the whole year, while spending RMB 30 million on advertising and promotion; that same year the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications announced RMB 7 billion in investment in the communications network and nationwide access fees fell sharply - a fatal blow to Yinghaiwei's self-built-network model. On June 22, 1998, its largest shareholder, Xingfa Group, converted shareholder loans into equity, raising its stake to 75%; Zhang Shuxin resigned the same day, and the executive team soon left en masse. Yinghaiwei became the most famous early "martyr" of China's internet.

Value conservation mapping: direction right (E's vision), model too early (T's social conditions not yet ready), revenue (E) unable to sustain the burn rate, S (investor confidence) exhausted in losses. Multiplication demands that the three multipliers move "in sync"; a vision that is merely ahead of its time cannot multiply value - which also explains why, on the same track, later entrants reap multiplied gains once S and T mature.

Sources: Guangming Net · Yinghaiwei's M&A race steps into a minefield, 36Kr · China's internet connects to the world, 1994-1999